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Introduction:
The Difficult First Amendment
ChristinaE. Wells*

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.'
The First Amendment looks easy. After all, its proscriptions are expressed
in fewer than forty-five words.2 It further embodies a concept elegant in its
simplicity: "Everyone has the right to say what they believe and to believe what
they want." Yet even a superficial glance at modem Supreme Court
jurisprudence reveals that, from its inception, the First Amendment was never
easy. Despite the Amendment's express mandate that Congress "make no law,"
the Court has never interpreted it as an absolute. Instead, the Court has
embarked upon a delicate and sometimes treacherous balancing act attempting
to determine when free speech or religious exercise rights trump state interests
and when they do not. So difficult is the Court's First Amendment doctrine that
one scholar has quite fittingly described it as "a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting and
entangled values, theories, rules, exceptions, [and] predilections... requir[ing]
determined interpretive effort to derive a useful set of constitutional principles." 3
Although the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has never been easy,
there was a time when it was easier. The Court's early jurisprudence, while

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. Tammy Eigenheer
provided valuable research assistance on this Introduction.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Compare the First Amendment, for example, with another venerable legal
institution, the United States Tax Code, which at "more than 5.5 million words spanning
over eight thousand pages in the United States Code" does not even look easy. See
Michelle Amopol Cecil, TowardAdding FurtherComplexity to the InternalRevenue
Code: A New Paradigmfor the Deductibility of CapitalLosses, 1999 U. ILL L. REV.
1083, 1084.
3. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy,and the FirstAmendment, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 267,278 (1991).
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fraught with difficult social policy concerns, posed reasonably straightforward
questions: May government officials punish a speaker for advocating a
particular ideology? 4 Must the government make its property available to the
public for expressive purposes?5 May a public school enact a policy requiring
the recitation of a particular daily prayer?' May the government require a license
to solicit religious donations?7 Coming in the early stages of its jurisprudence,
the Court's answers to these questions appeared as basic, foundational
principles: Government officials cannot discriminate against speech simply
because they or other members of society disagree with its content.' The
government must make some but not all of its property available to speakers.9
School-sponsored recitation of a daily prayer "officially establishes.., religious
beliefs" in violation of the First Amendment. 0 Substantial burdens on religious
solicitations impermissibly infiinge upon the free exercise rights of citizens.' I
Our increasingly complex world, however, has taken its toll on First
Amendment doctrine, adding layer after layer of difficulty to these seemingly
straightforward principles. Nowhere is that more evident than with the content
discrimination principles at the heart of the Court's free speech jurisprudence.
Under those principles, the Court heavily disfavors "content-based" regulations
-i.e., regulations aimed at speech because of its message. It does so primarily
to guard against illegitimate government motives, such as government
disagreement with the speaker's viewpoint, that so often underlie content-based
regulations.' Because so many of its early cases involved restrictive laws with

4. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (punishing speaker under breach
of peace statute for angering crowd).
5. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (requiring city permit
from chief ofpolice in order to lease public halls).
6. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
7. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
8. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
9. CompareHague, 307 U.S. at 515 ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest they have immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions."), with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48
(1966) (upholding protestors' convictions for trespass on jail property because First
Amendment "does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own
lawful nondiscriminatory purpose").
10. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
11. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943) (striking down flat license tax imposed upon solicitors as applied to
individuals soliciting for religious purposes).
12. See Christina E. Wells, ReinvigoratingAutonomy: Freedom andResponsibility
in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence,32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

159, 173-75 (1997).
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just such motivations, the Court's13unyielding antagonism toward content-based
restrictions was understandable.
Recent changes in technology have put great pressure on the Court's
traditional antagonism. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 ("the Cable Act"),14 for example, enacted "must-carry"
rules for cable operators, requiring them to devote certain channels to local
broadcasters.' 5 Does such a law violate the Court's prohibition on content-based
regulations? On the one hand, the law overtly requires cable operators to carry
material of certain speakers (i.e., broadcasters with local content), which
suggests an afiative answer. On the other, the regulations do not aim to
suppress a specific message but to enhance speech rights by preventing cable
operators from squeezing out local broadcasters, 6 which suggests a negative
answer. Not surprisingly, once the Cable Act reached the Supreme Court, the
Court's attempt to apply content discrimination principles ended badly, with the
Justices unable to agree even on whether the Cable Act was content-based.17
The once-simple principle disfavoring content-based regulations, then, has
become far less so in an increasingly modem world where government regulates
a specific industry in the name of public good rather than out of hostility toward
the speaker's message. 8
The Court's jurisprudence pertaining to speech on government property
further reflects the increasing intricacy of free speech doctrine. The "public
forum" doctrine initially came to life in an era of tangible property--streets,
parks, sidewalks, libraries, prisons, etc. The Court's task was to determine when
such property was available for expressive purposes. Its three-tiered approach
to this issue, 9 while barely coherent, at least involved property we could see and
13. See, eg., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) ("[D]enial of a tax
exemption for engaging in certain speech ... is frankly aimed at the suppression of

dangerous ideas."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) ("[A] state may
not unduly suppress free communication... under the guise of conserving desirable
conditions.").
14. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
15. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630-32 (1994) (describing
"must-cary" provisions of the Cable Act).
16. Id.
at 633-34 (citing to Congressional findings regarding the Cable Act).
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmnun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter
voted to uphold the regulations, arguing that they were essentially content-neutral. See
id. at 641-61 (majority opinion). Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsberg
believed that the regulations were illegitimately content-based. See id. at 674 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. For criticism of the Court's application of content discrimination principles in
Turner, see C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulations of
PersonsandPresses,1994 SUP. Cr. REV. 57; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets andMedia:
The FirstAmendment, the New Mass Media, and the PoliticalComponents of Culture,
74 N.C. L. REv.141 (1995).
19. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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touch. Moreover, application of the public forum doctrine to tangible property
involved two reasonably straightforward steps (classification of property into the
appropriate forum and subsequent application of the appropriate rule). The
expanding concept of property amenable to forum analysis, however, creates
tension within the Court's traditional approach.
Recently, the Court faced the issue of whether non-traditional
"property"--such as a monetary fund for university organizations created from
student fees2" or a debate among political candidates televised on a public
broadcasting station 2 1-were government-created fora to which speakers were
entitled access. In both cases, the Court found forum analysis to be
appropriate.' In extending its analysis to non-traditional property, though, the
Court raised issues far different from earlier decisions. In the student fc,
situation, for example, use of forum analysis required the Court to distinguish a
seemingly-applicable line of cases involving government subsidies of speech.'
In the candidate debate scenario, the Court had to grapple not only with forum
analysis but with its jurisprudence regarding the editorial discretion accorded to
broadcasters.' Extension of forum analysis beyond traditional notions of
property thus reveals an interdependence of doctrines formerly thought to be
The Court created three classes of fora: (1) "public fora" to which all speakers are
entitled access and in which the Court's content discrimination principles apply, (2)
"designated fora" which involves property the government is not required to make
available to speakers but once it does, content discrimination principles apply, and (3)
"non-public fora" from which all exclusions but viewpoint-based exclusions are
acceptable as long as they are reasonable. Id. at 45.
20. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788

(1985).
21. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
22. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674-83; Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829-30.
23. The Court accords almost total deference to government decisions selectively
to subsidize speech. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With

Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In contrast, if the Court deems government money
to be a forum for speech, selective exclusions of speakers are scrutinized more carefully.
See Perry,460 U.S. at 45-46. For a discussion of the interaction of these two doctrines
in the student fee cases, see Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229-32; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at

829-32.
24. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 668-76. The Court typically accords privately owned
broadcasters great deference in making editorial decisions. See Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The television station in Forbes,
however, was publicly owned. As such, Forbes raised the question regarding whether
the Court should analyze the issue from a public forum perspective (i.e., government as
owner of property) or from a journalism perspective (i.e., government as broadcast
journalist). Although the Court ostensibly used the former analysis, "the journalistic
character of Arkansas Educational Television may have been more determinative than
is indicated by the structure of the majority opinion." Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions,and the FirstAmendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84, 90 (1998).
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separate and raises questions regarding the continuing viability ofthose doctrines
in their current form.'
A case involving the opposition of the Free Speech and Religion Clauses
provides a final example. That the government cannot discriminate against
particular viewpoints is a cardinal principle of the Free Speech Clause. That
the government cannot directly fund religious organizations has been a cardinal
principle of the Establishment ClauseY Rosenbergerv. Rector ofthe University
of VirginiaO presented the Court with a clash between these principles, forcing
it to choose between them in a way that will only complicate existing doctrine.
In Rosenberger, a religiously-oriented student newspaper claimed that the
University of Virginia's exclusion of it from eligibility for student funds
amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The university maintained that the
Establishment Clause's prohibition on direct funding of religious organizations
compelled it to exclude the newspaper. The Rosenbergermajority ultimately
ruled in favor of the newspaper, holding that the Free Speech Clause required the
university to treat religiously-oriented newspapers in the same manner that it
treated secularly-oriented newspapers. To do otherwise would violate its
longstanding requirement of viewpoint neutrality in speech regulations.'
Rosenberger'sreliance on free speech principles does not merely resolve
the question of which clause trumps in a clash; it likely will have significant
implications for the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To many, the
Court's reliance on neutrality principles to protect the newspaper signals a
lessening of its traditional antagonism toward government funding of religious
organizations, at least when similar secular organizations receive funds3
Indeed, the Court specifically referred to Rosenberger'sneutrality principle in
justifying its most recent decision upholding the constitutionality of state and
25. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum--FromSidewalks to
Cyberspace,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1596-1610 (1998) (advocating that the Court use a
forum rather than a subsidy analysis in determining the constitutionality of conditions
attached to government subsidized speech); Schauer, supra note 24, at 97-99, 119-20
(suggesting that the Court discard forum analysis in Forbesin favor of rules gauged to
institutional specificity).
26. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
27. See Jesse H. Choper, Dangersto Religious LibertyFrom NeutralGovernment
Programs,29 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 719, 719-20 (1996) (noting the "long held precept"
that "government may not fund religious activities").
28. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

29. Id at 828-37.
30. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid
Separationismand the EstablishmentClause, 13 NOTRE DAmE J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
285 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME

J.L. ETHICs &PuB. POL'Y 341 (1999). But see Alan E. Brovnstein, Interpretingthe
Religion Clauses In Terms of Liberty, Equality and Free Speech Values-A Critical
Analysis of "NeutralityTheory" and CharitableChoice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 243, 268-78 (1999); Choper, supranote 27, at 720-21.
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federal aid programs as applied to parochial schools." The fractured nature of
this most recent decision, however, suggests that the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is far from settled.3 2
If the 1999 Term is a useful indicator, the state of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence weighs heavily on its mind. Ten of the seventy-three
decisions33 handed down during that period involved First Amendment
issues3 -- a remarkable number given that the Court has hundreds of
constitutional and federal statutory issues from which to choose its cases. 5
Furthermore, many of those cases garnered only thin majorities or pluralities,
reflecting profound disagreement among the Justices regarding the application

31. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2551 (2000).
32. Justice Thomas, who announced the Court's judgment in Helms, could garner
only a plurality of Justices to join his reasoning. Id. at 2536.
33. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: SplitDecisions; The CourtRules, America
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, § 4, at 1 (noting that the Court handed down
seventy-three cases last Term-the smallest number in decades).
34. The 1999 Term's First Amendment cases included the following: Mitchell v.
Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (upholding federal program providing aid in the form of
computers and other equipment to parochial schools); Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480
(2000) (upholding a bubble-zone statute pertaining to protests outside of hospitals and
medical clinics); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (ruling that state
antidiscrimination law as applied to Boy Scouts violated their right to associate); Ca.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) (striking down California's blanket
primary as violating political parties' right to associate); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000) (holding that practice of organized student-led prayer at
public high school football games violated the Establishment Clause); United States v.
Playboy Entm't Group, 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000) (striking down federal law requiring cable
systems to scramble or time channel sexually explicit channels); City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding city ordinance regulating nude dancing); Bd. of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (upholding university's use of student fees
to fund political student organizations); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000) (upholding Missouri's regulation of campaign contributions in state elections);
L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (upholding state
law permitting public access to arrestee's identity only for prescribed non-commercial
purposes).
35. Those ten cases represented almost fourteen percent of the Court's docket
during the 1999 Term. That percentage reflects a trend of increased interest in First
Amendment cases in recent years. Between 1985 and 1994, for example, the Court's
First Amendment cases constituted, on average, eight percent of its caseload. See LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 88-93, tbl. 2-9 (2d ed. 1996). In
contrast, from 1946 to 1955, First Amendment cases made up only an average of 5.7%
of the Court's docket. Id.
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of its jurisprudence? 6 It is safe to assume, I think, that the difficulties that mark
First Amendment jurisprudence are here to stay. 7
Much of this issue is devoted to the First Amendment. The themes running
through the articles and student note herein aptly reflect the increasing intricacy
of the Court's doctrine as well as recent and related trends in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Professor Brian Freeman's article,"8 for example, focuses on the
complexity of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence and its relationship to free
speech doctrine. Professor Freeman examines the religion clauses' traditional
commitment to neutrality toward religion and argues that the Court has
abandoned this principle, making "[g]ovemment neutrality in matters of religion
...hardly more than an aspiration."39 He goes even further to suggest that the
Court's treatment of religious exercise issues as compared to its free speech
doctrine reflects the Court's fundamental inability to grasp the continuity of
these First Amendment issues. Professor Freeman thus proposes a novel
approach for evaluating both free speech and free exercise claims that he argues
will bring coherence and "unity" to First Amendment doctrine.
Professor David Bernstein's article focuses on the association aspects of
the First Amendment Examining the Court's past freedom of association cases,
Professor Bernstein argues that the Court, though purporting to subject such laws
to the strictest of scrutiny, actually has applied a reasonably toothless version of
judicial review. As such, the Court's jurisprudence regarding association issues
has been out of step with other areas of First Amendment law. He finds hope,
however, in last Term's decision, Boy Scouts ofAierica v. Dale,41 which found
that aNew Jersey public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation violated the Boy Scout organization's First Amendment
right to expressive association. Dale, Professor Bernstein argues, not only
normalizes constitutional law, it actually benefits gays and lesbians, who are
generally better off with strong protection of the right to associate.

36. See, e.g., Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2530 (plurality); Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2480 (6-3
decision); Dale, 120 S. Ct.at 2446 (5-4 decision); Playboy, 120 S. Ct.at 1878 (5-4
decision); Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 277 (plurality); Shrink, 528 U.S. at 377 (6-3 decision).
The 1999 Term's abundance of split decisions represents a trend throughout the decade
of the 1990s. See Christina E.Wells, Of Communists andAnti-AbortionProtestors: The
Consequences of FallingInto the TheoreticalAbyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1,5 n.20 (1998).

37. In fact, the 2000 Term is also shaping up to be a significant one for First
Amendment issues. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Speaking ofFirsts... 86 A.B.A. J. 30
(2000).
38. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a
Unified Theory of First Amendment Exenptions From Neutral Lavs of General
Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9 (2001).
39. Id. at 81.
40. See David E. Bernstein, AntidiscriminationLms and the FirstAmendment, 66

Mo. L. REv. 83 (2001).
41. 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000).
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Professor Christina Wells's essay42 discusses Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC,4' a case decided last Term involving Missouri's campaign
finance laws. She argues that, while Shrink could be viewed as simply the latest
in a long line of decisions regarding campaign finance reform, its implications
are far more global. Specifically, she maintains that Shrink reflects certain flaws
associated with a common method of judicial review in First Amendment cases.
Failure to acknowledge that Shrink's flaws result at least partly from the Court's
approach to judicial review, Professor Wells argues, not only renders the
campaign finance debate incomplete, it affects the legitimacy of the Court's
decision-making generally.
Lynn Brackman's student note" tackles the thorny issue of student
expression. Although the Court has held that "students do not shed their
constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate," s its jurisprudence has been far
less simple. Recognizing that students are not yet adults, the Court also allows
schools leeway in regulating some aspects of students' speech while on school
premises. As Ms. Brackman's note discusses, the ensuing balancing act has
resulted in lower court decisions with wildly disparate treatment of students' free
speech rights. Such treatment leaves school officials with little guidance and
allows them far more discretion than necessary to fill their supervisory role. She
also suggests that the Eighth Circuit's recent actions push free speech doctrine
even further down the path toward eliminating student speech rights.

42. See Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The FirstAmendment
ImplicationsofNixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 Mo. L. REv. 141 (2001).
43. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
44. See Lynn S. Brackman, Note, High Schools and the FirstAmendment: The
Eighth Circuit Leaves Students'Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate, 66 MO. L. REV. 169
(2001).
45. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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